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ate superior in the State Department, Harlan Cleveland, enriches the value of
this forward-looking work.
ED-wARD McWHINNEY

Professor of Law and Member of the
Centre for Russian Studies
University of Toronto
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HUmAN JusTICE. By Julius Stone. Stanford: Stanford Uni-

versity Press, 1965. Pp. xxiii, 415. $10.00.
This is the second volume of Stone's three-volume revision and expansion
of his earlier Province and Function of Law (1946). The latter work is subtitled Law as Logic, Justice, and Social Control, and in his revision Stone devotes
a separate volume to each topic. The first volume, Legal System and Lawyers'
Reasonings, reviewed in 14 Buffalo L. Rev. 347 (1965) deals with the reasoning
used in the judicial process and with theories of legal reasoning. The present
volume deals with criteria for evaluating law and judicial decisions.
Stone approaches the question of what justice is by examining various
theories of justice, some briefly and some extensively. He begins with a short
survey of Greek and Hebrew theories, and continues with a lengthy account of
various natural law theories up to about 1800. Next comes a chapter on "metaphysical individualism," the idea that the aim of law is to protect the liberty
of the abstract individual, with theorists from Kant and Blackstone to
McReynolds J. and Hayek given brief attention. Stone then considers the
philosophies of Bentham, Ihering, Duguit, Stammler, Kohler, contemporary
natural law, Radbruch, and Pound. He dismisses briefly and effectively the
claims of language analysis and an intuitionist "sense of injustice" to shed any
new light on justice, and devotes a final chapter to his own views on justice.
Although the book is laid out in historical fashion, it is not actually a
history of theories of justice. Major figures are either given bare mention or
omitted completely: thus Plato and Aristotle are allowed one paragraph each,
and Hegel and Marx are omitted completely, although Stone repeats some
common misconceptions of the Hegelian dialectic in his discussion of Kohler.'
Conversely, relatively minor figures like Duns Scotus, Leonard Nelson, Arthur
Kaufman, and Werner Maihofer are given detailed and careful treatment. Nor
are the latter three discussed merely because of their recency; other recent
writers of at least equal importance-Alf Ross, Karl Llewellyn, E. N. Garlan,
Harold Laski, Kelsen, and Holmes-are not discussed at all or limited to a
few sentences, though Stone makes frequent footnote references to their arguments and discusses some of them in Volume 1 or 3. Plainly a selective principle
1.
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is at work. Stone selects his theories, not for their intrinsic importance and complexity, nor for their 'historical importance, nor even for their contemporary
relevance, but for the way they fit into a theoretical scheme with which he is
working.
The scheme finally appears in Chapter 10. It is a list of four central issues
2
in the theory of justice:
1. Natural law as contrasted with other (usually what is called "positivist") theories of justice, raises questions as to whether justice must
be thought of in terms of norms transcending the human ....
2. Metaphysical (or "a priori" or "pure") theories such as Kant's, on
the one hand, stand in contrast to empiricist theories such as Duguit's
on the other. The former claim to impose obligation by virtue of their
supposed non-derivation from the social facts . . . the latter claim to
impose obligation by virtue of the precise contrary, their derivation
from social facts ....
3. Theories which seek absolute standards ... Kant's or Stammler's
or Kohler's, stand in contrast with relativist theories, such as those of
Ihering, Radbruch, or Pound ...
4. . . . theories which seek to achieve justice by some general or
universal formula (such as Kant's or Stanmler's) stand in contrast
with those such as Bentham's or Pound's, which are directed to the
uniqueness of the judgment of justice in each particular situation.
These four issues are the ones that concern Stone throughout the book,
and control both his selection and his treatment of materials. He selects for
detailed discussion those theories which can best represent one or more of
the eight positions, and in each discussion probes the theory for the strengths
and weaknesses of the positions it represents. Thus for example in the chapter
on relativism he is concerned with the relativist position in general, and selects
Radbruch for detailed treatment because his is "the most comprehensive and
systematic modern attempt to validate relativist theories of justice . . .2
He selects for briefer discussion those theories which add some interesting
variation to a position or clarify some central point in it. For example he
discusses Leonard Nelson because Nelson adds a new wrinkle to the metaphysical position: "This claim to be able to deduce a system of ethical rules
constitutes here a special interest of Nelson's neo-Kantian version of justice." 4
Theories which exemplify positions already well represented can safely be
omitted or discussed in footnotes.
Stone notes that the four issues are not entirely independent but, on the
contrary, cluster rather closely together. They could, indeed, be oversimplified
to one basic issue: "a 'typical' natural lawyer will be embraced by the former
arm of all four distinctions; a 'typical' sociological jurist by the latter arm in
each case."'5 Now if we think of Stone, with Pound, as a sociological jurist this
2.
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would seem to imply that the basic opposition is between Stone and the natural
law theorists. However, this is not the case. Though Stone's sympathies lie with
the sociological jurists, he does not commit himself to any of the eight positions,
but tries carefully to weigh the merits of each one. He is particularly careful
in his probing of the natural law position, searching out all possible recent
versions that would make the position more clear and more plausible, and
describes himself as "a rather sceptical admirer at some distance."
Stone's conclusions are as follows:
1. The natural lawyer and the positivist can, and should, co-operate in the
quest for justice. Stone insists that natural lawyers have no monopoly of interest in justice and certainly do not have all the answers either. Nor is natural
law theory the only way to relate law and justice to God; the Hebrew prophets
had a theological interest in justice but did not use natural law concepts. But,
on the other hand, Stone affirms the possibility of expressing conceptions of
justice in natural law terminology, and suggests that for many centuries this
was the accepted thing to do. Thus he tends to see natural law terminology as
simply a convenient way of speaking about justice, and feels that positivists
should not take offense at terminology. To the extent that natural law theory
claims to be a distinct theory rather than just a way of speaking, Stone rejects
it; for instance he rejects the contention that an unjust law is not a law at all.
2. Neither the a priori nor the empiricist position is valid, according to
Stone. A prioridefinitions of justice cannot be made to yield specific conclusions
unless empirical propositions are tacitly added to them; empiricist positions are
similarly ambiguous. In addition, empiricists have not succeeded in deriving
obligations from facts, and a priorists have not shown why we are obligated
by a principle supposedly pure and remote from the world. The implication is
that all theories of justice must preserve a tension between facts and ideals, even
those which pretend to escape from one or the other pole. Also there is an inescapable emotive element in all theories of justice, since there is no indisputable
cognitive ground of obligation.
3. With regard to absolutism and relativism Stone clearly favors the
relativist position because it faces more directly the problem of adapting law
to changing conditions; but he feels that in times of rapid change and divided
societies even relativists such as Pound are at a loss. This is perhaps not so
much a criticism of relativism as a recognition of the difficulty of specifying
the content of justice in times of rapid change. In addition, Stone feels that
relativists should continually search for absolute principles of justice, though
they should never expect to find any. In the last chapter Stone presents, as his
own theory, nine "quasi-absolute" precepts, clearly successors to Pound's jural
postulates, which he thinks specify the content of justice at present in the indus6.
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trial West. Perhaps Stone's position could have been expressed more clearly and
less paradoxically if he had distinguished several senses of "absolute" and "relative" instead of formulating a grand dualism and then fogging it over.
4. With regard to universal and particular, Stone argues that it is impossible to define a universal justice in such a way that it yields unambiguous
results in particular cases. He contends that current definitions of justice in
terms of equality, fairness, or consent are hopelessly ambiguous, and makes the
same point for earlier definitions in terms of utility, interests, individual liberty,
and social solidarity. On the other hand a particularized justice cannot be
carried over from one case to the next. The solution here is to state preceptsthe jural postulates-which are relatively particular but not completely so.
Stone supports his conclusions with numerous and detailed arguments including both standard arguments against the various positions and new ones
of his own. Nearly all of the arguments and judgments seem to me to be sound,
though I feel Stone has not appreciated the strength of either the metaphysical
or the empiricist position, and consequently has failed to substantiate his contention that there can be no cognitive ground of obligation, either metaphysical
or empirical. But I am sure the proponents of the various positions will not be
convinced by these arguments. Critical arguments have two main functions:
for the opponents of a position they serve to eliminate the position and remove
it from one's area of concern; for the proponents of a position they serve to
point out weaknesses which must be corrected. Stone's stance is that of an
opponent, since his own position is different, in one important respect, from
any of the eight that he discusses. He treats all the theories he discusses (except
Pound's) as attempts to provide a firm cognitive foundation for justice. That is,
he treats them as attempts to derive specific directives of justice from some
source which has unquestioned validity-the will of God, nature, pure reason,
intuition, -human nature, the absolute goal of civilization, and so on. The
validity of the source then will guarantee the validity of the theory of justice
derived from it. But Stone's own position is pragmatic and functionalist; he
holds -that a theory of justice is validated, not by where it comes from, but by
what it does. A good theory of justice is not one which is derived by impeccable
logic from an unimpeachable source. It is rather one which performs well the
tasks of a theory of justice, the task of stabilizing and preserving areas of consensus on law and the task of controlling the reform of obsolescent law.
Stone's arguments are designed to show that all attempts to derive directives of justice from a valid source are faulty. Either the derivation is logically
faulty, or the results are ambiguous, or the validity of the source can be questioned. The effect of these arguments, for Stone, is to shift interest from dubious
sources to clear consequences. Again and again he points out how a theory that
has no adequate cognitive ground can still perform well the necessary tasks of
a theory of justice in its own time and place. "[T] he significance of a partic-
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ular theory of justice as a socially operative force is often a function of the
problems of the social context, rather than of the intellectual tenability of the
7
particular theory."
Arguments about the cognitive validity of theories of justice are thus essentially negative and preliminary for a functionalist. They serve to shift attention
from the secondary issue of logical validity to the primary issue of how well the
theory performs its necessary functions. Unfortunately most of the present book
is negative and preliminary, concentrating on abstract argument rather than
functional evaluation. There are brief functional treatments of some of the
theories of justice, and the last chapter makes a solid start at a functionalist
theory, but the bulk of the book is negative.
There is, perhaps, a good reason for this. A functionalist theory of justice
must be based on a "sociological" study of how law functions and changes, how
it is interrelated with other social controls, and how it is related to economy,
polity, and community. These topics are taken up in Stone's third volume,
Social Dimensions of Law and Justice, and consequently that volume is the
proper place to develop a positive theory of justice. As Stone observes, "For the
pragmatist, especially, every sociological inquiry may become simultaneously an
inquiry into justice. The severability of the two spheres, however clear or desirable in theory, tends to become impossible in practice." 8
It remains to list the differences between the present volume and its predecessor, part II of Stone's The Province and Functions of Law. Chapter 1 on
Greek and Hebrew ideas of justice is new, but so brief that its main value is
probably as a basis for a telling argument against natural law theory. 9 Chapter
2 on natural law is about half new, and Chapter 7 on 20th century natural law
completely new. Stone has changed his views on natural law theory, regarding
it now not as a specific theory of justice but as a way of speaking that people
used to adopt when they wished to raise questions about justice. For thousands
of years natural law terminology was the traditional way of speaking about
justice, and a great variety of theories were formulated in natural law terms.
Stone is interested in the variety of theories of this sort, even while he rejects
their claims to abstract validity and concrete precision.
Chapter 4 on Hedonist Utilitarianism is substantially the same, except that
the treatment of Bentham has been changed to take account of recent scholarship. Stone now argues, in sections 1 and 11, that individualist and laissez-faire
elements were mixed with collectivist-interventionist elements in Bentham's
political thought. He also discusses additional criticisms and defenses of Bentham's ethics in sections 19, 20, 21, and 23.
Chapter 8 on relativism and Radbruch is new, and most of Chapter 9 on
Pound is changed, as Stone has found new difficulties in Pound's thought as he
7. P. 299.
8. P. 4.
9. P. 293.
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applies Pound's theory to the problems of the new emerging nations. The difficulties of formulating jural postulates are even more obvious in these nations
then in the West, and it is even difficult to locate de facto interests in countries
that are changing so rapidly. Thus the time-and-place limitations of Pound's
theory become obvious.
Chapter 10 and 11 are almost completely new. In Chapter 10, Stone, classifying the issues among theories of justice, finds four instead of three, the new
one being natural law vs. "positivism." He also adds selections on language
analysis and the sense of justice. His own theory in Chapter 11 is also new. The
other chapters, 3, 5, 6, are largely unchanged except for occasional brief additions and improvements in wording. For example, in Chapter 3 the awkward
heading "Natural-law individualist wines in new metaphysical bottles" is replaced by the more elegant and appropriate "New metaphysical individualist
wines in natural law bottles."
The most pervasive change is the great increase in number of footnotes. An
average of one-third of each page is devoted to footnote arguments and citations,
and the total number in the book runs over 1600. Consequently the book really
moves on two different levels, one a straightforward discussion of the subject
and the other a scholarly commentary on commentaries, exploration of detailed
issues, and lists of references and cross-references. At its worst, as occasionally
in the first two chapters, this dualism produces a text so condensed and superficial that it is nothing more than an introductory survey, and footnotes so
complex and abstruse as to be of interest only to classical scholars. At its best,
as in the rest of the book, it produces both a solid, rich text, and an opportunity to pursue almost every point further in the footnotes. But if one wishes
to read both text and footnotes, one must be prepared for very slow going.
This is a highly condensed book, packed with arguments, by a scholar usually
in full command of a very wide range of materials, materials which have been
so well organized that the central issues of justice remain always in focus.
PAUL DIESING
Associate Professor of Philosophy
State University of New York at Buffalo

FAnR FIGHTs AND FouL, A DISSENTnTG LAWYER'S LIFE. By Thurman Arnold.
New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1965. Pp. vii-xi, 3-292. $5.95.
In this short, peppery book, Thurman Arnold has collected some sage observations concerning legal practice and social policy. The work is an attempt
to use the great changes in our social and legal thought-from the dogmatic
"theologies" of early 19th century economists, through the desperate changes
wrought by the Depression, up to the current economic uncertainty and experimentation-as an autobiographical basis.

